A phenomenon of certainty effect is well known as a typical paradox in expected utility theory and is often observed in the laboratory gambling to test the axiomatic system of utility theory. A necessary and sufficient condition that the certainty effect is obselved is demonstrated by means of a generalized utility function and some properties of individual's behavior derived from the condition are discussed.
Introduction
It is recognized that the theory of individual's behavior under uncertainry constitutes a fundamental field of operations research, management science, economics and so on. An expected utility model plays an important part in studies on this field and the copious literature on the decision-making under uncertainty has its origin in the ,=xpected utility model [9] . This model is generally accepted as a normative mod'21 of rational choice. Thus, it is assumed that all the rational individuals should make their decisions according to a set of axioms such as transitivity, independence and so on. After a skillfully planned paradox against the axiomatic system was first introduced by a French economist Allais[l] , many authors [2, 4] posed various examples that violate the so-called independence .axiom systematically by means of laboratory experiments called laboratory gamblings. Among others, Kahneman and Tversky [4] generalized the Allais' paradox and observed a so-called certainty effect ( or common ratio effect ), but they threw no light on the mathematical condition under which the certainty effe,:t is observed.
In the present paper, we consider situations of decision-making under uncertainty and provide a necessary and sufficient condition that the certainty effect occurs by means of a generalized utility function introduced by Machina [6, 7] . In Sections 2 and 3 we summarize the certainty effect and the gener-357 ~ Tabata alized utility function which plays an important role to explain the certainty effect theoretically. Section 4 demonstrates a necessary and sufficient condition that the certainty effect occurs. Concluding remarks are discussed in the last section.
Certainty Effect
In the conventional utility theory, it is widely accepted that the utilities of outcomes are weighted by their probabilities. As was mentioned in the previous section, many authors described that people's preferences systematically violate this principle. The most famous counter-example to expected utility theory is a phenomenon of certainty effect labeled by Kahneman and Tversky. This effect is explained in a word that people overweight: outcomes with certain, relative to outcomes with merely probable.
In this section we consider the certainty effect for the sake of the future discussion. To motivate our discussion on such a counter-example, let us consider the following Hagen-type simple laboratory gambling ( or lotteries as is usually employed to deal with the decision-making problem [l] . We ask the following question to you; Which of the lottery would you prefer,
) and reason as follows; " In the choice problem between l(l) and l(2), l(4) over l (3) ."
It is clear that the results violate the expected utility hypothesis since for a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function u satisfying the set of axioms, (3, 200) where V(l(·)) is an expected utility value for the lottery l(·).
As was stated by Tversky and Kahneman[lO] , these results imply that a reduction of the probability of an outcome by a constant factor has more impact when the outcome was initially certain than when it was merely probable.
In order to deal with this phenomenon more generally, we introduce the Assume that an individual prefers FI to F2 for P PI, that is, Decreasing thE' value of P from P I gradually, we often observe that he changes his preference order into F2 » FI for all P < po ( < PI). In this case it is called that the certainty effect occurs at P = Po. Figure 3 illustrates the situation. Since the result derived above is inconsistent with the expected utility hypothesis (or set of axioms in expected utility theory) and is obviously inexplicable within the framework of expected utility theory, his choice is usually explained as irrational. As the phenomenon is often observed, we cannot but conclude that it is impossible to explain the cer-- 3. Generalized Utility Function
As was described in the previous section, the phenomenon of certai.nty effect is not illustrated successfully in the framework of conventional expected utility theory. We can, however, deal with the phenomenon successfully from a mathematical view point by means of a generalized utility function recently introduced by Machina [6, 7] . In the present paper, we shall provide a necessary and sufficient condition that the certainty effect occurs. The concept of the generalized utility function is outlined as follows [3, 6] : and
with local utility function
It should be noted that various local properties of the preference functional V(.) are derived by the properties of the local utility function U(.;.).
Moreover, some properties can be extended to global properties [6] .
In the next section, we shall discuss the certainty effect by using ~his function.
Main Theorem and Corollaries
We now state and prove the major result of this paper. For simplicity we assume that the generalized utility function U(x;F) is increasing in x for any F(·). It 'was proved by Machina that this assumption is equivalent to
Theorem. For two simple Ragen-type lotteries described in Figure 2 , a necessary and sufficient condition that the certainty effect is observed at P = Po is that the generalized utility function U(x;F(·;a» satisfies the > following inequalities: For P < PO' It is noted that the lotteries FI and F2 can be rewritten as
where G denotes the probability distribution which assigns unit probability a to the point a. Thus, it is clear that and (6)
Now, without loss of generality, we assume that an individual prefers the lottery FI(·;l) to the lottery F 2 (';q) (5) and (6),
continuous function of p and ~(O)
O.
Moreover since Fl(-;l) >-F2(-;q). Thus, as is shown in Figure 4 , there exists some po such that ~(po) = 0_ These facts on equation (8) and inequality (7) imply that equation (3) (2) is negative. This result means that <I>(p*)
< 0. On the other hand, 9(1) > 0, so the certainty effect is observed. 
Concluding Remarks
This paper is contributed to the certainty effect which is often observed in the laboratory gambling to test the expected utility theory and is inconsistent with the set of axioms. A necessary and sufficient condition under which the certainty effect is observed is provided by means of the genera1:lzed utility function defined on the choice SE!t. It is shown that the certainty effect is not contradictory to an individual's rationality although it is rejected in the expected utility theory for the reason of individual's irrationality. It is presented that the convexity of the generalized utility function is a fundamental property of the sufficient condition and corresponds to the well-known properties of the theory of ri.sk aversion in the expected utility hypothesis [8] . In Corollaries 1 and 2, we find that a plunger with negative generalized Arrow-Pratt measure always shows the phenomenon of certainty effect and a risk averter with positive one never does. This result suggests that the risk averter is faithful to the expected utility hypothesis and so long as a model with a concave von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function is employed, the expected utility hypothesis never breaks down. It is, however, clear that the individual's behavior may not be discussed fully by the model with concavity assumption only.
